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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article will attempt to show that, despite much scholarly dis-
paragement of the traditional "prompt, adequate and effective" standard
of compensation for expropriation, when put to the test of deciding ac-
tual cases through arbitration, international law produces results not dis-
similar from what might be expected under that standard. The Article
compares the law of damages in international arbitration with United
States domestic law and points out their similarities.
No subject evokes more passion and polarization in international
discourse than the so-called North-South dialogue. In brief, the so-called
"Southern Countries" seek a new economic order based on their theory
that the developed countries are somehow responsible for the plight of
the less developed countries (LDC's). The developed countries of course,
ardently resist this. They insist that, before such a new order can even be
explored meaningfully there must be clear understanding of and agree-
ment on, among other things, international legal norms affecting the
movement of international development capital.'
* Partner, White & Case, New York, New York, Member, District of Columbia and New York
Bars. The author is deeply indebted to his partner, Thomas J. O'Sullivan, and his valued associates,
Pierre-Yves Tschanz, Augustin Douoguih, and Alice K. Jump, for their varied contributions to this
article. Despite the importance of their contributions, the final wording and conclusions are the
author's alone and do not necessarily (or actually) represent their views of policy or law.
I See Metzger, Property in International Law , 50 VA. L. REV. 594, 603 (1964); Muller, Compen-
sation for Nationalization: A North-South Dialogue, 19 COLUM. J. INT'L L. 35, 37 (1980); Note, The
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The same polarization characterizes discussions of one particular
legal norm, the proper standard of compensation in nationalization of
alien property by a sovereign state, especially when the property involves
foreign private capital.2 Up until the end of the nineteenth century when
massive nationalizations were still a rarity, the notion was universally
accepted that those who appropriate another's property must pay for it.
3
Secretary of State Hull, when articulating what he perceived to have been
the proper standard of compensation, used the phrase "prompt, adequate
and effective" to describe that standard.4 But, although his wording was
apt, the Secretary of State did not invent this standard. As Professor
Doman correctly points out, "the question of awarding compensation to
owners of expropriated property and abolished vested rights is many
thousand years old.' In fact, Hull's formula represented a significant
improvement over the earlier practice of enforcement by states of such
claims with military force, intimidation or both.6
The "prompt, adequate and effective" standard has been the official
position of the United States Department of State over the years. More-
over, other capital exporting countries widely accepted Secretary Hull's
formulation because of the perception that it was both elementary and
fair.7 As the International Court of Justice (I.C.J.) observed in 1952:
GeneralAssembly's International Economics, 16 HARV. INT'L L.J. (1975) (also authorities and com-
ments therein).
2 See Philippe Kahn, Etat Actuel du Droit des Investissements Etrangers dons les Pays en Voie de
Developpement, International Law Association 283, 305-306 (Kluwer 1973): "En ce qui concerne
les modalit~s d'une nationalisation les pays exportateurs de capitaux proposent g~nralement de la
reconnaitre si une indemnit6 prompte, adequate et 6ffective est vers~e aux anciens propri6taires. Les
pays en voie de developpement, sans rejeter toujours le principe d'une indemnit6, contestent les
caract~ristiques qu'elle devrait presenter selon les pays exportateurs de capitaux."
3 This principle was so well settled that, in treaties among the more advanced nations of Eu-
rope, compensation for appropriated alien property was almost never mentioned; it was taken for
granted. See Fachiri, Expropriation and International Law 6 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 159, 169-170
(1925).
4 Note of Secretary of State Hull (Aug. 22, 1938), quoted in Dawson & Weston, "Prompt, Ade-
quate and Effective'" A Universal Standard of Compensation?, 30 FORDHAM L. REV. 727, 734
(1962).
5 Doman, Postwar Nationalization of Foreign Property in Europe, 48 COLUM. L. REV. 1125
(1948). The author adds that, in the present century, only the label "nationalization," is new, point-
ing out that in the mid-1800s the French recognized this prinicple when they paid compensation to
slaveowners after abolishing slavery in their colonies.
6 See Fachiri, supra note 3, at 163-167, in which the author illustrates this approach in the
context of the British Government's threat of naval intervention with respect to claims of its citizens
against the Government of Sicily in 1836, the United States government's successful protest to
Greece on behalf of an American victim of expropriation in 1853, and a similar protest by the
British, French and Spanish Governments on behalf of their respective nationals whose property had
been confiscated by Portugal in 1910.
7 See Wortley, The Protection of Property Situated Abroad, 35 TUL. L. REV. 739, 740 (1961):
"The prima facie right to recover possession of a thing seized is based upon the elementary notion of
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[w]hen there are so many countries in need of foreign capital for the devel-
opment of their economy, it would not only by unjust, it would be a grave
mistake to expose such capital, without restrictions or guarantee, to the
hazards of the legislation of the countries in which such capital has been
invested.8
Since the two world wars, with the Mexican agrarian takings, the
massive nationalizations by the communist bloc countries of Eastern Eu-
rope and the emergence of the Third World countries of Africa, Asia and
Latin America which found a ready-made forum in the United Nations
General Assembly, the traditional rule of compensation has come under
vigorous attack.9 The challenge is premised partly on the notion that the
rule, as a creature of Western civilization, should yield to a new standard
more acceptable to the Third World and the communist bloc countries
which had no part in the elaboration of the old rule. t° Others argue that
the old rule in fact no longer prevails because, in practice, very few arbi-
tral awards or negotiated settlements amount to a strict adherence to the
rule. This latter view finds unintended support in the practice of as ar-
dent a supporter of the traditional rule as the United States government
because:
. ..sometimes for political reasons or because of the inability of the other
state to pay, both the United States and private investors have accepted
substantially less than full compensation, especially in 'lump-sum'
settlement. 11
Perhaps the most important, certainly the most vociferous, attack
on the traditional rule in the last two decades has come about as a result
of various United Nations resolutions that appear to dilute the old stan-
dard."2 But while the rule undeniably is being challenged, it clearly still
corrective justice, i.e., that the man whose thing is seized, without explanation, is entitled to recover
it, or its equivalent."
8 Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case, 1952 I.C.J. 93, 162. The quoted passage appears in Domke,
Foreign Nationalizations: Some Aspects of Contemporary International Law, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 585
(1961).
9 This attack has usually taken the form of a general opposition to Western positions on the
status of foreign investments in United Nations debates. See, e.g. , Falk, The American Attack on the
United Nations: An Interpretation, 16 HARV. INT'L L.J. 566, 568 (1975).
10 For both a negative and positive statement of this view, see respectively, Anand, Rdle of the
"New" Asian-African Countries In The Present International Order, 56 Am. J. Int'l L. 383, 387
(1962) and Baxter, Treaties and Customs, Recueil des Cours 25 (1970) reprinted in HENKIN, PUGH,
SCHACTER & SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW 73 (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as HENKIN].
S1I RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 712 reporter's note 1 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1983).
12 Two of these resolutions have engendered much debate since their adoption. The first is G.A.
Res. 1803 (XVII) of 1962 Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, article 4
of which speaks of "appropriate" as the standard of compensation; the second is G.A. Res. 3281
(XXIX) of 1974 entitled "Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States," article 2(2)(c) of which
recognizes the right to nationalize with "appropriate" compensation as the standard, but confers
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survives. Indeed, the state practice that has emerged has neither enjoyed
the unanimity nor reflected the consistency required to establish a new
customary rule of international law in this area. As regards the United
Nations resolutions, General Assembly resolutions are non-binding.
Even assuming, arguendo, that over time such resolutions can acquire
the status of law because they have been accepted or incorporated in the
municipal laws of most states, neither the legislative history of these
United Nations resolutions nor the attitude of the industrialized states
provide any clear evidence that they are now so accepted.
There are two explanations for the continuing vitality of the tradi-
tional rule. The first is that the moral basis of the old rule never has been
challenged seriously, because the notion that one whose property has
been seized ought to be compensated fully appeals to one's sense of jus-
tice and fairness. The second, and perhaps equally compelling, reason is
the awareness on the part of capital importing countries that, if foreign
investors were certain that upon nationalization they would receive no
compensation or less than full compensation as the host country deemed
appropriate, they would either not invest at all, require an inordinately
high rate of return, or insist on such extraordinary guarantees that the
host country would derive very little, if any, benefit from the investment
and might end up worse off than had the investment not been made in
the first place.
This Article does not address the issue of the right of a state under
international law, absent agreement to the contrary, to nationalize prop-
erty within its borders. Nor does this paper deal with the measure of
reparation due for an unlawful taking of alien property. 13 Assuming
compensation is to be paid for a lawful nationalization, there does seem
to be general agreement that such compensation should be prompt and
effective. Once the principle of compensation is admitted, it is not unrea-
sonable to require that it be paid promptly, otherwise the compensation
could be seriously devalued. In the extreme case of the nationalization of
a very profitable investment, if payments were stretched over a long
enough period, the nationalizing state could use the profits generated by
that investment to compensate the investor. Needless to say, that would
make a charade of the whole notion of compensation because the inves-
jurisdiction of disputes arising out of nationalizations on the courts of the nationalizing state as well.
A third resolution has also been the subject of controversy, namely Resolution 3201(S.VI) contain-
ing the "Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order," which omits
any reference to the state's duty to pay compensation, thus arguably implying the rejection of any
control of international law over the measure of compensation.
13 A separate paper might be written comparing the law of damages for violations of United
States antitrust law with reparations for unlawful nationalizations.
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tor is entitled to a reasonable return on his investment in the first place.
Similarly, the compensation must be effective, that is, in a currency that
the alien can repatriate to his own country. In practice, this means pay-
ment must be in a freely convertible or hard currency. Obviously, if the
alien cannot use the money he has received, he has not been compen-
sated. It is not even necessary to argue, as do Dawson and Weston, that
. . .'effective' payment would seem. . . a reasonable goal. . . not only to
assure minimum stability in the investment community, but to encourage
reinvestment either in the depriving state or elsewhere.
14
It hardly needs to be pointed out that there has been no compensation if
one whose property has been expropriated can only use compensation
received in the nationalizing state, an environment obviously hostile to
the foreign investor as evidenced by the very act of nationalization. The
controversy is really about the "adequate" portion of Secretary Hull's
formulation of the standard. Consequently, the focus of this article will
be on what constitutes "adequate" compensation as reflected in recent
arbitration decisions and how that formula compares with standard for-
mulations of compensation by United States courts.
II. HISTORICAL COMPENSATION CONCEPTS UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW
The obligation of a state to compensate an alien for deprivation of
property is not an invention of modern international law.' 5 Nor was this
notion, as one might be inclined to suppose, limited to Western legal
thought and culture. As the sole arbitrator in theLIAMCO v. Libya case
said with respect to the value accorded private property in another legal
system: "it is relevant to record that Islamic law recognized the inviola-
ble character of the right of property, on the basis of the Holy Koranic
Verse: 'And do not appropriate unlawfully each other's property' (S II,
188)." 16 Both in their municipal laws and international practices, most
states recognized this principle. Even the Calvo doctrine, often regarded
as a derogation from this principle, did not deny compensation as such:
it merely provided that aliens were not to be treated differently from na-
tionals, so that the obligation to compensate was implicitly accepted.
17
Before this century, and certainly in Europe, nationalizations as
14 Dawson & Weston, supra note 4, at 739.
15 See Doman, supra note 5.
16 Libyan American Oil Co. (LIAMCO) v. Libya, 62 I.L.R. 140, 184 (1977); (translation from
the Ottoman Majallah Code provided by the arbitrator, a Moslem legal scholar) [hereinafter cited as
LIAMCO Award ].
17 For a fuller explanation of the Calvo doctrine, see Hackworth, Digest of International Law
§ 530 at 635 (1943). See also Metzger, Property in International Law, 50 VA. L. REv. 594, 598-600
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such were rather rare;' 8 consequently, compensation as a legal norm did
not evoke much debate. At the beginning of the twentieth century the
practice of states with respect to compensation was so well established
that it justifiably could be considered a customary rule of international
law. Thus, the Permanent Court of Arbitration, The Hague, noted that
where municipal law and international law differ, the latter must prevail
in deciding issues of compensation. The court stated:
But the tribunal cannot agree, on the other hand, with the conention of the
United States that it should be governed by American statutes whenever the
United States claims jurisdiction. This trubunal is at liberty to examine if
these statutes are consistent. . . with well established principles of interna-
tional law, including the customary law and the practice of judges in other
international courts.
19
By this time state practice had gone beyond the mere recognition that a
taking of alien property entailed a correlative obligation to provide com-
pensation; it was not enough that the standard of compensation adopted
under municipal law fell short of a denial of a remedy, or that it did not
single out aliens for discrimination.
But the real debate, then as now, was about the adequacy of com-
pensation. An exchange of notes between Mexico and the United States
in 1938 with respect to the Mexican agrarian takings illustrates the ear-
lier tone of this debate. The Mexican government had expropriated large
land holdings in order to implement its land reform legislation. Some of
this land belonged to American citizens. Mexico, which in its Constitu-
tion of 1917 had incorporated the principle of compensation based on
restitution, at least for land taken from the Indians,2" did not want to be
bound by an international standard of compensation. The United States
saw matters differently. In July, 1938 Secretary of State Hull wrote:
During recent years the Government of the United States has upon re-
peated occasions made representations to the Government of Mexico with
regard to the continuing expropriation by your Excellency's Government of
agrarian properties owned by American citizens without adequate, effective
and prompt compensation being made therefor.
In response, the Mexican Foreign Minister wrote to the American
Ambassador in August of that same year:
(1964), in which the author notes that Latin-American countries which for the most part subscribed
to this doctrine nonetheless had compensation incorporated into their constitutions.
18 See Dawson & Weston, supra note 4, at 729.
19 Norwegian Ship Arbitration Case, United States v. Norway, 17 AM. J. INT'L L. 362, 385
(1922) or Norwegian Shipowners' Claims, I R.I. R. Int'l Arb. Awards A.A. 307, 330-31 (Perm Ct.
Arb. 1922).




My Government maintains, on the contrary, that there is in international
law no rule universally accepted in theory nor carried out in practice, which
makes obligatory the payment of immediate compensation nor even of de-
ferred compensation, for expropriations of a general and impersonal char-
acter like those which Mexico has carried out for the purpose of
redistribution of the land ...
Secretary Hull, in the retort that made the phrase famous, said in
part:
• . . under every rule of law and equity, no government is entitled to expro-
priate private property, for whatever purpose, without provision for
prompt, adequate and effective payment therefor.
21
Interestingly, Mexico and the United States, in a settlement that in
theory amounted to acceptance by Mexico of the American position,
agreed upon a lump-sum payment."2
The Soviet bloc countries have adopted the Mexican view. They
believe that international law is irrelevant to the question of how alien
property should be treated because, in their view, only the municipal law
of the nationalizing state, as sovereign, should govern such matters.2 3
Thus the battle lines were drawn. While countries of socialist per-
suasion and later the Third World countries would continue to challenge
the traditional rule as formulated by Secretary Hull, that position would
gather support among western publicists, their governments, and interna-
tional tribunals, although the latter did not always use the American
phraseology. For example, one noted scholar, using full compensation in
lieu of "prompt, adequate and effective," said:
There is in fact much material which inspires the contention that when
judicial opinion imposes payment offull compensation within a reasonable
time as a condition to be satisfied by a requisitioning state on account of its
action in time of war, the expropriation of alien owned property in time of
peace cannot lawfully be effected on lighter terms.
24
Similarly, the various peace treaties signed after the Second World
War included compensation, based on restitution, for property of United
States nationals, seized during the war.25
21 Excerpts of diplomatic exchange between Mexico and the United States, 19 Dep't of State
Press Rel. 50-52, 136-37, 140, 143-44 (1938), reprinted in HENKIN,supra note 10, at 687-88 [empha-
sis added]. The Mexican Government did admit an obligation to provide adequate compensation,
but this, it insisted, was mandated by its own municipal law.
22 Dawson & Weston, supra note 4, at 740-42.
23 On the position of Soviet jurists, see generally Fatouros, International Law and the Third
World, 50 VA. L. REV. 783, 808 (1964). With respect to the treatment by the individual Eastern
European countries after World War II, see Doman, supra note 5, at 1143-1158.
24 1 Hyde, International Law, 711-12 (1945), quoted in Doman, supra note 5, at 1137-38 n. 36
[emphasis added].
25 Doman, supra note 5, at 1140.
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It is interesting to note that the objection to the traditional rule be-
gan, as in the Mexican case, in the context of extensive expropriation.
The reason for this and the appeal of the Mexican and communist bloc
views to the Third World becomes obvious upon reflection. In the ex-
treme case, suppose a country occupied or colonized by an outside power
or sovereign had all its land, or most of it, owned by citizens of the occu-
pying power. Upon attaining independence, it is theoretically free to un-
dertake any reform it pleases. Must it buy all the land back from the
aliens who own it, and if so, with what resources, assuming for present
purposes that land is the main productive resource of the country? This
must be the situation that Dawson and Weston had in mind when they
wrote:
To assert, as do some, that states lacking sufficient gold reserves, foreign
exchange or other financial resources should not undertake social and eco-
nomic reforms, which may necessitate enacting extensive deprivation laws
is both unrealistic and patronizing. After years of political or economic
inferiority, nations which are but recently independent. . . are unlikely to
accept voluntarily externally conceived restrictions incompatible with their
legitimate aspirations. Extensive deprivations may be of such absolute and
relative magnitude as to render "full" compensation truly impossible.26
While this scenario raises interesting questions, such cases are so
rare nowadays that they can be only of historical interest. The real issue
today is what treatment is to be accorded property held by foreign inves-
tors who are freely invited into a country to further its development.
One example of such property is concessions, including those first negoti-
ated under a predecessor colonial regime, but usually freely renegotiated
after independence to take account of the new political realities. As to
those types of property, it is the position of this article that the tradi-
tional rule is still valid.
The "prompt, adequate and effective" compensation standard has
been criticized on the ground that the practice of states on the one hand,
and arbitral awards on the other, do not conform to the traditional stan-
dard. On this basis, some would argue that the rule is no longer, if it ever
was, a valid rule of international law.
This argument, however, is flawed. In the modern world no legal
standard is always achieved in practice. If states in their relations with
one another choose to accept less than the law would allow them, this
does not mean that the law therefore allows them less, so that like the
object in Zeno's fifth paradox it approaches but never reaches the posi-
tion of zero because it is always getting only halfway to the goal.
26 Dawson & Weston, supra note 4, at 738.
27 HENKIN, supra note 10, at 783 and authorities cited therein.
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The fulcrum of the practice of states argument is that, in fact, states
do not insist, inter se, on prompt, adequate and effective compensation.
Rather, the settlements usually involve a lump-sum payment, sometimes
stretched over many years. In the Mexican agrarian takings referred to
earlier, the United States accepted much less than the amount of its
claim.28 Nor is the United States alone in accepting compensation at
variance with that mandated by the traditional standard.2 9 A look at
those cases which are submitted to adjudication rather than settled tends
to indicate that, although, as in municipal law, the claimant usually asks
for more than he or she is entitled to and hence is awarded less than was
claimed, the claimant has in fact received "full," "fair" or adequate com-
pensation. The fact that settlements frequently return less than the full
value of the claims does not devalue the claims or the legal standards by
which they are to be judged, but instead reflects the same practicalities
that cause domestic claimants to accept in most instances less than the
full value of their claims. It is estimated that ninety-five percent of all
domestic cases are settled.3" As the Second Circuit said in Banco Na-
cional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank:
The notion that, merely because a negotiated settlement will not result in
full payment, a victim of expropriation has no right to more than partial
compensation simply confuses adjudication with compromise. . . . we
should no more look to the outcome of such a process to determine the
rights and duties of the parties in expropriation matters than we would look
to the results of settlements in ordinary tort or contract cases to determine
the rules of damages to be applied.31
III. OTHER COUNTRIES
The United States is not the only country that maintains that the
traditional rule continues to represent the proper standard of compensa-
tion in international law. In fact, a growing number of countries are
incorporating the traditional rule in their bilateral investment agree-
ments. In March, 1982, Japan and Sri Lanka executed an agreement
concerning the promotion and protection of investment. Article 5(2) of
that agreement reads in its entirety as follows:
28 See supra note 20. For a $350 million claim, the U.S. accepted $40 million in annual install-
ments. HENKIN, supra note 10, at 689. With respect to the nationalization of the oil company
holdings, the figures were $260 million and $24 million, respectively.
29 See Dawson & Weston, supra note 4, at 742, 745, 747-748 in which the authors catalog na-
tionalizations in Bulgaria, Czecoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, Yugolslavia, France, Iran
and the Suez Canal nationalization, concluding that none complied with the "orthodox" prompt,
adequate and effective standard.
30 Ann. Rep. of Admin. Office of the U.S. Cts. Fed. Civ. Actions (year end 6/30/82).
31 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 658 F.2d, 875, 892 (2d Cir. 1981).
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Investments and returns of nationals and companies of either Contracting
Party shall not be subjected to expropriation, nationalization, restriction or
any other measure, the effects of which would be tantamount to expropria-
tion or nationalization, within the territory of the other Contracting Party
unless such measures are taken for a public purpose and under due process
of law; are not discriminatory; and, are taken against prompt, adequate and
effective compensation 32
A United States State Department lawyer could not have written a better
agreement for the parties. It is interesting to note that this article goes
beyond what even ardent advocates of the traditional rule could have
expected, incorporating as it does the public purpose test. Similar Agree-
ments using either "prompt, adequate and effective" or "appropriate"
(with the same meaning) have been executed, for example, by Britain and
Egypt and recognized in various "treaties of friendship, commerce and
navigation" involving France and other members of the OECD.3 3 It
would appear, therefore, that, in relations between states, the traditional
rule is gaining wider acceptance, contrary to claims of its detractors.
International tribunals, on the other hand, perhaps because they do
not function in a political vacuum, have not based their awards explicitly
on the "prompt, adequate and effective" compensation standard. But, as
has been shown above, in practice they have rendered awards which sub-
stantially accord with that standard.
In view of the foregoing analysis, arguments that the practice of
states has de facto abrogated the traditional standard of compensation
would not appear to take into account recent experience.
IV. UNITED NATIONS' RESOLUTIONS
Some analysts have suggested that the United Nations, through res-
olutions such as G.A. Res. 1803 and Res. 3281 (especially Article 2(2)(c)
thereof) has ushered in a new and different standard of compensation,
namely, "appropriate" as against "prompt, adequate and effective." The
answer to this contention can be summarized in two ways. First, advo-
cates of a new rule such as Weston readily admit that "the principle of
compensation as an international regulatory norm is yet alive, even if
under attack."' 34 Second, the legislative history of Resolution 1803 and
court decisions make it abundantly clear that the necessary discrepancy
between the traditional rule (full compensation) and "appropriate" com-
32 Agreement Concerning The Promotion and Protection of Investment, Mar. 1, 1982, Japan-Sri
Lanka, art. 5(2), 21 I.L.M. 963, 965-66 (1982) (emphasis added).
33 See Muller, supra note 1, at 42 (1980). The British-Egyptian Agreement uses "prompt, ade-
quate and effective" as well as the public purpose test.
34 Weston, supra note 4, at 454.
Compensation for Nationalization
5:871(1983)
pensation does not exist.
35
Traditionally, General Assembly resolutions are advisory rather
than binding, but, as Brower & Tepe point out in their analysis of the
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States:
in the full context of adoption of G.A. Resolution 1803 (XVII), the word
"appropriate" compensation could only mean prompt, adequate and effec-
tive compensation. There is no doubt that this is a mandatory obligation
under international law, that such compensation "shall" be paid.3 6
The United States and other industrialized nations went along with Res-
olution 1803 only after they satisfied themselves that "appropriate" was
not a dilution of "prompt, adequate and effective."
Schwebel has argued persuasively that the legislative history of Res-
olution 1803 (XVII) supports the view that "appropriate" and "prompt,
adequate and effective" are not only compatible, they are also the same
standard. The author bases his conclusion both on the fact that Article 8
of the Resolution accords special importance to foreign investment agree-
ments freely entered into, and that the United States withdrew its opposi-
tion to the Resolution only after making it clear that it was satisfied that
appropriate compensation did not amount to a new international law
standard.37 In addition, the Second Circuit noted in Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank 38 that
"the adoption of an appropriate compensation requirement would not ex-
clude the possibility that in some cases full compensation would be
appropriate.'
'39
Usually, municipal court decisions have only limited value as a source of
35 Indeed, compare the notion of "appropriate" compensation with the arbitrator's award of
"equitable compensation" in the LIAMCO Award, supra note 16, at 73-74.
36 Brower & Tepe, Jr., The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States: A Reflection or
Rejection of International Law, 9 INT'L LAW 295, 301 (1975). The authors correctly point out that:
the tra[d]itional language bridging the preamble and Chapter I of the Charter (4e., "solemnly
adopts the present Charter. . .") does not in itself establish any binding legal effect of the
Charter, although it might be noted that the United States had suggested as an alternative the
even more clearly nonbinding phrase "solemnly declares the following prinicples."
37 Schwebel, The Story of the U.N. 's Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Re-
sources, 49 A.B.A.J. 463 (1963). The author was assistant legal advisor to the United States Delega-
tion to the 17th General Assembly of the United Nations. He notes that the resolution passed by a
vote of 87 to 2 (France and So. Africa) with 12 absentions; the United States voted with the majority
under the circumstances noted. Article 8, mentioned in the text, reads as follows:
Foreign investment agreements freely entered into by, or between, sovereign states shall be
observed in good faith; states and international organizations shall strictly and conscientiously
respect the sovereignty of peoples and nations over their natural wealth and resources in accord-
ance with the Charter and the principles set forth in the present resolution. Id. at 464.
See also id. at 466 in which the author notes the U.S. ambassador's position and elaborates on why
the norm is still prompt, adequate and effective compensation.
38 658 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1981).
39 Id. at 892.
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international law, but it is interesting to note that in the AMINOIL
Award, infra, the Tribunal quoted this passage from the Second Circuit
with approval.'
Using two recent international arbitration awards as models, this
article will contend that the measure of compensation employed by inter-
national arbitrators reaffirms the prompt, adequate and effective standard
and, in fact, parallels, in many respects, the well established techniques
that United States courts use in securities valuation cases. The two deci-
sions that shed the most light on the subject areKuwait v. Aminoil a' and
LIAMCO v. Libya .42 Both cases involved the nationalization of long-
term oil concession agreements. Both opinions discuss specific valuation
techniques in some detail and the methods employed by the arbitrators in
measuring damages are relatively clearly delineated.
V. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE OF KUWAIT V. THE AMERICAN
INDEPENDENT OIL COMPANY (AMINoIL)
A. Background
On September 19, 1977, the government of Kuwait enacted Decree
No. 124 which terminated a concession, originally granted to Aminoil in
1948, for the exploration and exploitation of petroleum and natural gas
in Kuwait's "Divided Zone." Under the terms of the 1948 agreement,
the concession was to run for sixty years.
The concession contract had been amended in 1961 and in 1973.
Generally, these amendments imposed higher income taxes on Aminoil
and increased the royalty rate payable to the Kuwait government. The
1961 amendment also confirmed the stabilization clause contained in the
1948 agreement. By 1973, the government royalty rate was 16.67% of
the posted price and the tax rate on profits was 65.75%.
In 1974, the members of OPEC adopted the "Abu Dhabi formula"
which raised the royalty rate to twenty percent of posted prices and the
tax rate on income to eighty-five percent. On the basis of the "evolution
clause" incorporated in the concession in 1961, the government at-
tempted to impose these terms on Aminoil and to apply them retroac-
tively in order to recoup the windfall profits attributable to the dramatic
rise in oil prices during this period. A long period of negotiations be-
tween the parties followed but no agreement was reached.
40 Kuwait v. American Independent Oil Co. (AMINOIL), 21 I.L.M. 976, 1033 n. 8 (1982) [here-
inafter cited asAMINOIL Award].
41 See supra note 40.
42 See supra note 16.
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In September, 1977 the government issued the nationalization de-
cree which terminated Aminoil's concession. The decree ordered that all
"interests, funds, assets, facilities and operations" of the company revert
to the state.43 It set up a Compensation Committee to calculate "the fair
compensation" due to the company as well as to assess the company's
outstanding obligations to the state or other parties.
Aminoil requested arbitration pursuant to the terms of the 1948
agreement. Kuwait agreed to arbitration in July 1979. Arbitration pro-
ceedings commenced in December of that year before a three person
tribunal.
B. The Claims of the Parties
In summary, the government of Kuwait sought royalties and taxes
due under the 1973 agreement from January, 1977 to the date of nation-
alization (September 19, 1977) ($32,876,000), and additional amounts for
the period of November 1, 1974 to September 19, 1977 due under the
"Abu Dhabi formula" ($92,007,000). The government also sought in-
demnification for Aminoil's liabilities to third parties ($18,588,867); re-
covery for damage resulting from "lost oil" ($5,780,750,000); various
expenditures for repair of active wells and pipelines and plugging and
abandoning suspended wells ($11,632,300); expenditures claimed to be
required to bring the refinery at Mina Abdullah up to a proper standard
($65,000,000); and interest in an amount to be determined by the
Tribunal.
Aminoil set forth two alternative compensation formulas.
The first formula calculated lost profits in the amount of $2,587,136,000
based on total anticipated profits until the natural termination of the con-
cession (the year 2008), but discounted at an annual rate of interest (rate
not given) in order to determine present value. The value of the physical
assets was not included in the calculation because the terms of the 1948
agreement provided that at the expiration of the concession the undertaking
should be handed over to the government "free of cost." The second
method counted and discounted anticipated profits in the same way over a
limited period of years. Using this measure, Aminoil claimed that it also
was entitled to the value of the assets seized which Aminoil calculated as
$185,300,000. Aminoil also claimed compensation for other assets in an
amount to be agreed upon by the parties' auditors or, if no agreement were
reached, in the amount of $30,356,000; claimed overpayments to the gov-
ernment in the amount of $423,072,000; and interest on all the above
amounts.
In response to Aminoil's claims, Kuwait asserted that it only owed
43 AMINOIL Award, supra note 40, at 998.
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the company compensation for the net book value of assets transferred to
the State which the government estimated at $44,600,000.
C. Principles of Compensation Adopted by the Arbitrators
The Tribunal started with the general principle set forth in United
Nations Resolution No. 1803 of December 14, 1962. The resolution pro-
vided that in cases of nationalization the owner of the property shall be
paid "appropriate compensation."' The Tribunal decided that, in deter-
mining what award is appropriate, it was bound to look into "all the
circumstances relevant to the concrete case.",45 It also based its decision
on the precept that compensation must be calculated on a basis which
"warrant[s] the upkeep of a flow of investment in the future.46
At the outset, the Tribunal rejected the government's claim that
compensation should be limited to "net book value" of the assets.47 The
Tribunal found that a book value approach would violate Aminoil's legit-
imate expectation that it would receive a reasonable rate of return from
the concession. The Tribunal rejected the government's assertion that
book value compensation was the custom of the oil industry both as a
matter of fact and as a matter of law.48 It distinguished the precedents
that stemmed from a series of nationalizations in the years 1971-1977. In
those cases, the nationalized companies had often continued to maintain
a preferential relationship with the host country government after the
nationalization. Because the companies continued to derive substantial
economic benefit from contracts for supplies and services, they received a
"hidden value" not included in the formal compensation measure. In
Aminoil's case, however, all relationships with the government were sev-
ered. There was no trade-off between taking limited compensation for
the present and maintaining good economic relations for the future.
The Tribunal also pointed to the political and economic pressures
underlying the general acceptance of the book value standard. After
1973, the oil producing countries wielded enormous economic power.
Faced with a seller's market, the concession owners seriously were con-
cerned with maintaining an adequate supply of petroleum products to
44 AMINOIL Award, supra note 40, at 1032-33.
45 Id. at 1033. Compare this flexible fact-oriented approach to that of United States courts as
articulated in Woodward v. Quigley, 133 N.W.2d 38 (1965).
46 Id. The Tribunal assumed that Kuwait was a country that favored foreign investment and
was also an important investor abroad. The Tribunal declared that in this case there was no room
for rules of compensation that would make "nonsense of foreign investment." Id.
47 Compare this approach to that of Judge Hand in Borg v. Int'l Silver Co., I1 F.2d 147, 152 (2d
Cir. 1925). See also infra text accompanying note 85.
48 AMINOIL Award supra note 40, at 103.
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consumers. This inequality in bargaining power led the major transna-
tional companies to accept de facto the demands of the exporting coun-
tries. The elements of duress inherent in the situation undermined the
precedential value of the compensation awards. Economics lay at the
root of the companies' acquiescence. Therefore, their acceptance of lim-
ited compensation based on book value did not form a proper basis for a
meaningful rule of law.
The Tribunal thus made Aminoil's expectations under the conces-
sion agreement the centerpiece of the compensation determination:
[The legitimate expectation] formula is well advised, and justifiably brings
to mind the fact that, with reference to every long-term contract, especially
such as involve an important investment, there must necessarily be eco-
nomic calculations, and the weighing up of rights and obligations, of
chances and risks, constituting the contractual equilibrium. This equilib-
rium cannot be neglected-neither when it is a question of proceeding to
necessary adaptations during the cause of a contract, nor when it is a ques-
tion of awarding compensation.49
Focusing on the contractual expectations of the parties as reflected in the
original agreement and subsequent modifications and reinforced by the
state's undertaking not to pass any confiscatory measure (stabilization
clauses), the Tribunal decided that Aminoil was entitled to receive com-
pensatory damages that would be equivalent to a "reasonable rate of re-
turn" on the nationalized property. In essence, it adopted the second
measure that Aminoil had proposed: compensation based on asset value
and lost profits over a reasonable period of time. The Tribunal rejected
Aminoil's calculation of its claimed lost profits, however, because of per-
ceived fallacies in Aminoil's underlying assumptions. Aminoil had based
its figure on the assumption that the concession would have continued
until 2008 under the contractual conditions imposed in 1961. The Tribu-
nal pointed out that this could not be true because the status of the par-
ties was altered significantly by the 1973 agreements and the imposition
of the Abu Dhabi formula. Moreover, communications between the par-
ties during 1976-1977 indicated that Aminoil had resigned itself to a
more moderate estimate of profits."
The Tribunal also pointed out that, in determining a reasonable rate
49 Id. at 1034. The determination of appropriate compensation by reference to the notions, de-
rived from the international law principle of good faith, of "legitimate reliance" and "reasonable
expectations" of the investor is advocated convincingly by Dolzer, New Foundations of the Law of
Expropriation of Alien Property, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 553, 579 et seq. (1981). See also Francioni,
Compensation for Nationalisation of Foreign Property: The Borderline Between Law and Equity, 24
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 255 (1975).
50 Id. at 1036. Refunds due the government under the Abu Dhabi formula were also part of
Aminoil's "legitimate expectations."
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of return, one normally would increase the rate by a certain level to pre-
serve incentive and allow for technological risks. But incentive and risk
factors disappear in the case of a concession that already has been
terminated.
Having rejected Aminoil's lost profit calculation, the Tribunal set
forth its own principles for appraising the value of the nationalized prop-
erty-principles which are logical and reasonable on their face. It de-
cided to appraise both the value of the undertaking itself as a source of
profits and the totality of the assets.
The Tribunal rejected net book value as the proper method of valu-
ing the physical assets. It declared that world inflation mandated an ap-
praisal method more "in line with economic realities. . . . In
calculating the value of depreciating assets, it would be unfair to settle it
on the basis of a superannuated cost consisting of the original purchase
price when that price has no relation to the actual present cost.""1 The
Tribunal pointed out that, because the company had a right to recoup the
capital value of the investment in the oil undertaking, inflation had to be
taken into account. Moreover, the Tribunal found that the 1948 contract
and the 1973 modification showed that the parties always intended to
deal in terms of real values, without accounting for monetary fluctua-
tions.5 2 Therefore, the Tribunal linked compensation for the resource
assets to the progress of inflation generally and to the price of refined
petroleum products on the American market in particular.
D. Compensation Awarded by the Arbitrators
The Tribunal developed a "balance sheet" of the financial rights and
obligations as of September 19, 1977, the date the nationalization
occurred.
The Tribunal concluded that under the 1973 agreement Aminoil
owed the government $32,228,500 in taxes and royalties. The Abu
Dhabi formula took effect in January, 1975. The Tribunal found that
from 1975 to 1977 Aminoil made a total profit of $101,615,000. Under
the Abu Dhabi formula, the government was entitled to $71,963,000.1
3
51 Id. at 1039.
52 The Tribunal pointed out that the "general principle of the preservation of value of money
. . .was consistent with the spirit of the contract." This principle had already been upheld in at
least two well-known arbitral awards. See Kahn, Contrats d'Etat et nationalisation-Les apports de
la sentence arbitrale du 24 mars 1982, 109 J. DROIT INT'L 844, 864-65 (1982). The original (1948)
concession contained a gold clause whereby payments made by Aminoil were tied to the official U.S.
purchase price for gold. In addition, payments under the Abu Dhabi formula or the 1973 agreement
were automatically indexed to the petroleum products market in the Gulf States.
53 Aminoil would have been entitled to keep $29,652,000 of that profit.
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The Tribunal found that Aminoil's debts to third parties, which the
government discharged, totalled $18,849,500. Thus, as of September 19,
1977, the total of Aminoil's liabilities owed to the government were
$123,041,000.
The Tribunal's reasoning as to the actual determination of the
amount Aminoil was owed is somewhat unclear. The Tribunal stated
that it based its calculations on the values of various components of the
undertaking separately considered, and of the undertaking itself consid-
ered as a going concern.5 4 The Tribunal used the depreciated replace-
ment value for both fixed and non-fixed assets and came up with a sum of
$206,041,000. Subtracting the $123,041,000 in liabilities mentioned
above, the Tribunal concluded that, as of September 19, 1977, Aminoil
was owed $83,000,000.
To decide what was owed in 1982 the Tribunal capitalized the sum
at 17.5% (representing an interest rate of 7.5% and an inflation rate of
ten percent. Therefore, the total award was $179,750,654.
VI. LIAMCO v. LIBYA
A. Background
In 1955, the Libyan Ministry of Petroleum granted three conces-
sions (No. 16, 17 and 20) to the Libyan American Oil Company
(LIAMCO). The concessions, which followed a model set out in the
Libyan Petroleum Law of 1955, gave the concessionaire the exclusive
right for fifty years to search for, extract, and sell petroleum. The con-
cessions were amended on several occasions between 1955 and 1968 with
LIAMCO's consent.
In their final form each concession provided that "the contractual
rights expressly created by this concession shall not be altered, except by
the mutual consent of the parties" (Clause 16)." Clause 28 of each con-
cession provided for the settlement of disputes by arbitration and stated
that the concession
shall be governed by and interpreted in accordance with the principles of
the law of Libya common to the principles of international law and in the
absence of such common principles then by and in accordance with the
general principles of law, including such of those principles as may have
been applied by international tribunals.
5 6
After the Libyan revolution of 1969, the Qadhafi government em-
barked on a program of nationalization. In September 1973, the govern-
54 AMINOIL Award, supra note 40, at 1040-41.
55 LIAMCOAward, supra note 16, at 141.
56 Id. at 141-142.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 5:871(1983)
ment nationalized fifty-one percent of LIAMCO's concession rights and
in February, 1974, took over the remainder. The Libyan government
announced that LIAMCO would be compensated for the net book value
of the nationalized assets, but no compensation actually was offered.
LIAMCO requested arbitration pursuant to Article 28 of the con-
cessions. Over the objections of Libya, an arbitrator was appointed by
the President of the International Court of Justice. Libya did not take
part in the arbitration proceedings.
B. LIAMCO's Claims
LIAMCO sought three separate forms of relief:
(1) specific performance, through a declaration by the arbitrator
that the act of nationalization constituted a fundamental breach of the
concessions. In effect LIAMCO asked for the full restoration of its con-
cession rights and a return to the status quo ante; and
(2) a declaratory award, whereby the arbitrator would declare that
Libya's acts were unlawful and not entitled to international recognition,
and that Libya's title to LIAMCO's property was invalid; or
(3) in lieu of specific performance, an award of damages. The
damage claim had three elements:
(a) $13,882,677, the market value of LIAMCO's physical plant
and equipment as of the date of nationalization. The figure was based on
original cost, less depreciation, adjusted for variations in construction
costs through the application of the appropriate construction cost
index.57
(b) $186,270,000, compensation for loss of the concession 20.
LIAMCO based its estimate on the following method. LIAMCO as-
sumed that the existing production rate of 75,000 barrels per day would
continue until December 31, 1988, the end of the concession term. Using
the July, 1976 official market price, LIAMCO calculated gross revenues
and then deducted projected operating costs and expenditures.
LIAMCO based those figures on tax and royalty rates in effect prior to
the first nationalization in 1973. Subsequent increases both in oil prices
and tax and royalty rates were disregarded. LIAMCO then discounted
this sum by an annual rate of twelve percent to arrive at the $186,270,000
figure.
(c) $7,500,000 for the loss of concession IT" Since the fields dis-
57 Clause 26 of the Concession Agreement gave the concessionaire the right to remove the physi-
cal assets upon expiration or termination of the concession. Id. at 211.
58 LIAMCO did not claim compensation for concession 16 because no oil was ever discovered
there. Id. at 142 n. 7.
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covery in 1959, development of concession 17 had proved impractical.
Nevertheless, LIAMCO contended that the dramatic jump in world oil
prices made future development feasible and it claimed compensation for
the loss of this future right. LIAMCO also stated that the punitive in-
creases in the tax and royalty rates levied by the Libyan government pre-
vented it from developing the field commercially.
LIAMCO claimed interest at a twelve percent rate from January 1,
1974 to the date of payment. In addition, LIAMCO sought arbitration
costs and expenses.
C. The Approach Used by the Arbitrator
The arbitrator concluded that the concession agreements were valid
and that their choice of law clause should be given effect. Under that
clause, principles of international law basically governed the agreement.
At the outset, the arbitrator rejected LIAMCO's claims for specific
performance and the declaratory award. The arbitrator stated that these
remedies were impossible to implement as a practical matter. Moreover,
the imposition of the remedies would challenge the undoubted power of
the state to nationalize. The arbitrator maintained that the nationaliza-
tion of concession rights, if non-discriminatory and not accompanied by
a wrongful act, was notper se unlawful. Therefore, the act of nationali-
zation could not be undone.59
Having rejected LIAMCO's other claims, the arbitrator focused on
the appropriate measure of damages. He stated that it was clear under
both Libyan and international law that the government was liable for
some kind of indemnification. He also held that such indemnity should
include, as a minimum, the market value of the nationalized property,
including fixed assets, installations and various expenses. For that rea-
59 Id. at 197-199. The arbitrator noted that, even though Islamic jurisprudence mandated that
"rights are to be restored in kind if possible," specific performance could not be used in the interna-
tional field, because full restitution was considered "as against the respect due for sovereignty of the
nationalizing state." The arbitrator's rejection of specific performance as a remedy in nationalization
cases should be contrasted with the decision in Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. v. Libya (1977) 17
I.L.M. 1 (1978), 104 J. DROIT INT'L 350 (1977). In that case, the arbitrator declared that specific
performance or restitutio in integrum was the accepted remedy for breach of contract under Libyan
and international law. By signing a concession agreement which contained a "stabilization clause",
Libya had waived its power to nationalize and was thus subject to the normal rules for breach. In
practical terms, however, the imposition of specific performance in Texaco v. Libya was ineffective.
The decision declared that, if Libya refused to perform its obligations to Texaco and to restore the
prenationalization status quo, it would open itself up to a later judgment for damages. Therefore, the
imposition of the specific performance remedy did not eliminate the problem of valuation, but
merely deferred it.
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son, the arbitrator awarded LIAMCO $13,882,677 to compensate for the
loss of physical assets and equipment.
The real controversy centered on recovery for the lost profits of the
concessions themselves. The arbitrator analyzed general Libyan Civil
law, international law relating to wrongful taking and international law
relating to lawful nationalization. 61 In the first two instances, the arbi-
trator concluded, the case for loss profits was clear. Only in the case of
lawful nationalization did the standards become confused. While con-
ceding that the nationalization was lawful, the arbitrator noted that
states have to observe international standards of conduct such as the rule
of non-discrimination and the necessity of paying due compensation. 6'
LIAMCO argued that the classic formula of "prompt, adequate and
effective" compensation mandates the full recovery of lost profits. 62 The
arbitrator pointed out, however, that the "prompt, effective, and ade-
quate" formula had been modified and supplanted in post-World War II
nationalizations.
The classical doctrine [of "prompt, adequate and effective"] was not always
accepted neither in the interwar period nor after World War II. Adequate
compensation as including loss of profits, such as awarded in the old...
arbitral decisions was no more acceptable as an imperative general rule. It
retains only the value of a technical rule for the assessment of compensa-
tion, and a useful guide in reaching settlement agreement, as well as and
justly asserted. . . . It stands only as a maximum rarely attained in
practice.
63
The arbitrator seemed to link the prompt, adequate and effective
standard to compensation for the loss of all future profits for the
unexpired term of the concession; however, he declared that such exten-
sive recovery was unwarranted under the doctrine of "unforeseen
events."'  That doctrine empowered the courts "to revise those provi-
sions of a contract as might become excessive and exorbitant due to the
advent of extraordinary circumstances."65 The arbitrator noted that in
lieu of the old standard more recent arbitration decisions were apt to
60 LIAMCO Award supra note 16, at 202-08.
61 Id. at 204-08.
62 See generally Dawson & Weston, supra note 4, at 734.
63 LIAMCO Award, supra note 55, at 206 [citations omitted].
64 Of course, Anglo-American law has always recognized that unforeseen events may alter or
discharge a party's obligations under a contract. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 261 (1979). As a separate proposition, common law has also recognized that those contract dam-
ages must be limited to what is "foreseeable." See Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
The LL4MCO Award arbitrator seems to be merging the two concepts by stating that unforeseen
events may reduce the level of damages that the breacher must pay.
65 LIAMCO Award supra note 16, at 207.
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characterize their compensation awards as "convenient and equitable,"66
but he did not adopt this standard. Rather, applying what he termed
"equitable compensation" the arbitrator used the following method to
calculate damages.67 He first compared LIAMCO's claim for
$186,270,000 for the value of its concession 20 with the actual profits
realized on the field by the Libyan National Oil Company (NOC). NOC
had taken over the property on the date of the first nationalization de-
cree. The arbitrator concluded that, based on its record from September,
1973 to the end of 1976, NOC would have made a net profit of
$56,895,645 on concession 20 through 1988. LIAMCO claimed that the
difference between its $186 million estimate and the $56 million NOC
estimate was due to the high posted prices, income tax, and royalty rates
imposed by the Libyan government immediately prior to nationalization.
The arbitrator decided that the NOC figure was more realistic in
that it represented actual profit from 1973-1976. Moreover, he noted
that LIAMCO would have had to accept the government's high posted
prices and tax and royalty rates if the concession had continued.68 Nev-
ertheless, the arbitrator recognized that an award equalling the actual
profits of LIAMCO's successor did not compensate LIAMCO for the
great expenses and risks attendant upon the initial development of the
project.
...it is undeniable that the bases of this evaluation constitute a discharge
of the contract and a frustration of intention of the contracting parties.
Moreover, they do not take into consideration the great initial expenses and
risks taken by LIAMCO in their pioneer work and subsequent activities.
69
Therefore, in what seems to be a compromise between what is "conve-
nient" and what is "adequate," the arbitrator added $10,000,000 to the
NOC figure and awarded LIAMCO $66,000,000 for its interest in con-
cession No. 20.
The arbitrator rejected LIAMCO's loss of profit claim for conces-
sion No. 17. Pointing to the fact that the field had never been economi-
cal, the arbitrator considered any claim for future profits to be
speculative and uncertain.7 ° Therefore, he only granted compensation
for the loss of the field equipment.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 209-10. The arbitrator characterized equitable compensation in accord with the general
trend of international theory on concepts of sovereignty given the lawfulness, motives and frequency
of nationalizations.
68 Id. at 213. The prices and rates were acceptable to the co-concessionaires. In 1966,
LIAMCO had acquiesced to an increase in tax and royalties.
69 Id. at 213.
70 Id. at 214-215.
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The arbitrator granted interest on the award starting from January
1, 1974 and running to the date of payment. He set the rate at five per-
cent, a figure commensurate with the rate in commercial cases under Lib-
yan law. LIAMCO also received $203,000 in costs and expenses.
There are, of course, significant differences between the arbitration
cases involving expropriation outlined above and United States securities
appraisal techniques. 7 Nevertheless, a comparison between securities
appraisal cases and expropriation of foreign enterprises is productive be-
cause it shows certain similarities in the methods used to determine the
fair value of an enterprise.
VII. VALUATION CONCEPTS IN THE UNITED STATES
There is considerable law and lore regarding corporate valuation;
indeed, the valuation of companies arises in many different contexts in
United States domestic litigation. The discussion in this article addresses
one such situation, that of the dissenting shareholder. The position of a
nationalized company is somewhat analogous to that of a shareholder
who dissents from a corporate merger. In both cases, holdings have been
"taken over" against the will of the owner; in both cases, compensation is
called for.
The task that United States courts perform in such cases was sum-
marized in the case of the Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye,72 which in-
volved a stockholder dissent from a merger:
The basis concept of value. . . is that the stockholder is entitled to be paid
for that which has been taken from him, viz., his proportionate interest in a
going concern. . . . In determining what figure represents this true or in-
trinsic value [of his stock], the appraiser and the courts must take into con-
sideration all factors and elements which reasonably might enter into the
fixing of value. Thus, market value, asset value, dividends, earning pros-
pects, the nature of the enterprise and any other facts which were known or
which could be ascertained as of the date of the merger and which throw
any light on future prospects of the merged corporation are not only perti-
nent to an inquiry as to the value of the dissenting stockholders' interest,
but must be considered by the agency fixing the value.
71 These differences are particularly evident when the expropriated enterprise is an oil conces-
sion. In the case of a concession which terminates on a specific date, there is a cut-off point to the
earnings stream. Therefore, it is possible to circumscribe future earnings within a given time limit.
Thus, it is theoretically possible to calculate the sum total of all future earnings. This total then can
be discounted to its present value. The magnitude of discount factor depends on the rate of return
on money, the amount those dollars would be earning if they were available now. See generally
Wegel and Weston, infra note 75. Actually, the same is true as a practical matter for other price/
earnings ratios because the present value of many more than twenty years out becomes very small.
72 74 A.2d 71, 72 (Del. 1950).
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Every state in the United States has enacted an appraisal statute
which entitles dissenting minority stockholders, in the event of certain
corporate action (normally mergers), to demand appraised value for their
shares.73 The standard for compensation is "fair value" which most state
statutes have left undefined. United States courts traditionally have fo-
cused on three factors in trying to determine how much the dissenters'
stock is worth: (1) net asset value, (2) earnings or investment value and
(3) market value.74
For purposes of comparison to nationalization cases "market value"
seems inappropriate, at first glance. The "market" for a nationalized
company is, by its very nature, a limited one. The assets involved are
unique, and there is no free entry of "buyers" or "sellers." Therefore, the
fundamental prerequisites for a market in the traditional sense do not
exist.7" So while market or replacement value evidence can be found for
certain components of a nationalized enterprise such as physical assets,
plants or equipment, the measure is of less utility when applied to the
expropriated firm as a whole, unless its stock has been selling in a market
unaffected by threats of expropriation. The market value approach looks
for evidence of the price that the going concern would receive if there
were willing buyers and sellers and a market. Because that evidence may
not be available, efforts to approximate the price that persons would be
willing to pay for the enterprise are really the basis of the other two ap-
proaches. Where there is an active and available market (as for example
in the securities of a company listed upon the New York Stock Ex-
change), however, courts are relying increasingly upon the market alone
to set value.76
In the absence of a recognized market, the two other factors of the
three-pronged valuation technique-net asset value and investment
value-become the essential determinants. There is no set procedure,
however, for deciding how much weight each factor should receive.77
No one formula is binding or conclusive. Thus, even though there are
guidelines, valuation is first and foremost a matter of judgment.
73 See, e.g., MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 81, 8 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (1984), N.Y.
[Bus. CORP. LAW] § 623 (consol. 1963) (amended 1984).
74 See Banks, Measuring the Value of Corporate Stock, 11 CAL. W. L. LAW REV. (1974), Note,
Vaulation of Dissenters Stock Under Appraisal Statutes, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1453 (1965-66).
75 D. Wegel and B. Weston, Valuation upon the Deprivation of Foreign Enterprise: A Policy-
Oriented Approach to the Problem of Compensation Under International Law in 1 VALUATION OF
NATIONALIZED PROPERTY UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW (R. Lillich, ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited
as Lillich].
76 See, e.g., Seaboard World Airlines Inc. v. Tiger Int'l Inc., 600 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1979).
77 Woodward v. Quigley, 133 N.W.2d 38, 53 (Iowa 1965).
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VIII. NET ASSET VALUE
In calculating net asset value, courts in the United States are con-
fronted with competing theories on what an asset actually embodies.78
An asset is a component of the firm in its static state. In other words,
one could value the asset by determining for how much it could be sold
at that moment in time.7 9 In short, an asset can be valued in terms of
what a willing buyer would pay for it.
Obviously, the book value of the asset as shown on the company's
balance sheet is a possible starting point."0 But United States courts have
been almost unanimous in rejecting book value as a proper measure of
compensation. 81 There are several reasons for this position. First, the
balance sheet normally lists assets at original cost less accumulated de-
preciation. In an inflationary era, book value is substantially below the
fair market value of the asset at issue. Second, book value does not take
into account the development costs incurred before a particular asset can
be listed on the balance sheet.82 This is particularly true in cases where
natural resources are involved.83 Third, book value does not reflect the
value of the asset as part of a productive entity or "going concern."
The third objection was articulated by Judge Learned Hand in Borg
v. International Silver Company :84
The suggestion that the book value of the shares is any measure of their
actual value is clearly fallacious. It presupposes, first, that book values can
be realized on liquidation, which is practically never the case; and, second,
that liquidation values are a measure of present values. Every one knows
that the value of shares in a commercial or manufacturing company de-
pends chiefly on what they will earn, on which balance sheets throw little
light.
The law of eminent domain provides an alternative measure of an
asset's worth. In cases of taking under the Fifth Amendment, courts
have equated "just compensation" with the fair market value of the prop-
erty taken." The classic definition of market value is "the price which
78 SeeAnnot., 43 A.L.R.3d 430, 438 (1972) and authorities cited therein.
79 See Woodward v. Quigley, 133 N.W.2d 38, 40-42 (Iowa 1965).
80 Under generally accepted accounting prinicples, book value of the company is defined as the
difference between a company's total assets and the total liabilities as listed on their balance sheet.
81 See In re Valuation of Common Stock of Libby, 406 A.2d 54 (Me. 1979), Brundage v. New
Jersey Zinc Co., 48 N.J. 450, 226 A.2d 585 (1967), Note Valuation of Dissenters Stock Under Ap-
praisal Statutes, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1453 (1966).
82 Joseph McCosker, Book Value in Nationalization Settlement, in 2 Lillich.
83 The Arbitrator in LIAMCO Award recognized that the value of resource assets embodies the
cost incurred in exploiting them. See supra note 68-69 and accompanying text.
84 11 F.2d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 1925).
85 BONBRIGHT, VALUATION OF PROPERTY, 413 (1st ed. 1937).
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would be agreed upon by a willing seller and a willing buyer under usual
and ordinary circumstances, after consideration of all available uses and
purposes, without any compulsion upon the seller to sell or the buyer to
buy.
86
Going concern asset value, a third alternative measure, is an elusive
concept. In wrestling with the issue, courts have tended to blur the dis-
tinction between asset value and earnings value.87 Thus, in Gibbons v.
Schenley Industries, Inc. 18 the court declared that "the investigating or
trading public in reaching a judgment as to the value of corporate shares,
gives consideration to corporate assets only insofar as they disclose a ca-
pability of generating earnings.89 Similarly, a New York court pointed
out that net asset value in and of itself was not the basis for determining
the value of stock of an industrial enterprise as a going concern.90 The
assets were committed to and derived worth from the operation of a busi-
ness. Therefore, any number of factors other than the "naked value of
physical assets will determine the success or failure of operations and
consequent value, above or below the net asset value of the business."'
Of course, earnings value and asset value merge in cases in which a
corporation's business depends to a large extent on the exploitation and
possession of physical assets.92 Real estate and resource holdings typi-
cally fall into this category. For example, real property assets are some-
times appraised by estimating the net rental income they will produce
and capitalizing the income stream according to the current rate of re-
turn on similar rental property. In Sporberg v. City Specialty Stores 93 the
appraiser held that the net rental value of certain stores owned by a cor-
poration was the best guide to the value of the real estate involved. He
based his income determination on evidence presented by real estate ex-
perts. He then capitalized this income at the rate of six percent to arrive
at the asset value of the property. In other words, the asset value was
approximately 16.6 times the annual income stream. (The multiplier is
the inverse of the capitalization rate and is the same as the price/earnings
ratio of a stock.)
On the other hand, if the asset is not producing income because of
86 Poole v. N.V. Deli Maatschappij, 243 A.2d 67, 70 n. I (Del. 1968).
87 Contrast the approach taken in Poole v. N. V. Deli Maatschappij, supra note 86 with that
taken in In re Olivetti Underwood Corp., 246 A.2d 800 (Del. Ch. 1968).
88 339 A.2d 460 (Del. Ch. 1975).
89 Id. at 473.
90 Application of Marcus, 273 A.D. 725, 79 N.Y.S.2d 76 (lst Dept. 1948).
91 Id. at 29, 79 N.Y.S. at 79.
92 BONBRIGHT, supra note 86.
93 123 A.2d 121 (Del. Ch. 1956).
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obsolescence or other reasons, net asset value should be discounted ac-
cordingly. For example, in Application of Delaware Racing Association ,9
the corporation's prinicpal asset was a racetrack. It had no earnings to
speak of because of social and economic changes. When the track was
first built, it was easily accessible by railroad but as automobiles became
more popular, the value of the location was eroded. The court held that
the negative effect of the change in the transportation pattern, combined
with the cost of eventually converting this property to residential pur-
poses, substantially reduced net asset value.
These cases clearly reflect the tendency of courts in the United
States to be flexible in the valuation of assets. They do not necessarily
bind themselves to traditional notions of book value or fair replacement
value. They have recognized that such static measures bear little relation
to the value of the asset in the total earnings scheme.
IX. EARNINGS OR INVESTMENT VALUE
A. Definition of Earnings
The determination of earnings value of stock as a whole (as opposed
to a particular asset) involves an attempt to predict future income pri-
marily on the basis of its past earnings record.95 There are problems with
this method. First of all, earnings must be defined. Their level will vary
depending on which accounting standards are used. Second, courts have
to address the question of what are typical earnings. It has become a
general practice, particularly in Delaware where so many appraisal cases
arise, to extrapolate future earnings from the average earnings figure
taken over a time period immediately preceding the merger or other cor-
porate undertaking against which a dissent has been expressed. 96
In Delaware, the generally accepted time span from which an earn-
ings average can be calculated appears to be five years.97 The purpose of
averaging earnings over such a period is to minimize the impact of a
typical profits and losses. Thus, inAdams v. R.C. Williams & Co. 9' the
94 213 A.2d 203 (Del. 1965).
95 For a summary of this technique, see W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS 136 (5th
ed. 1980) [hereinafter CARY & EISENBERG].
96 As Cary & Eisenberg, supra note 95, point out when accounting principles are in a state of
flux, the alternative treatment of major items may affect earnings materially. Factors like inventory
valuation (LIFO or FIFO), depreciation methods, amortization of investment credits, and unfunded
pension costs may cause the earnings per share figure to differ significantly.
97 See, e.g. , Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Francis, 312 A.2d 394, I. duPont & Co. 334 A.2d 216
(Del. 1975), Gibbons v. Schenley Industries, Inc., 339 A.2d 460 (Del. Ch. 1975). In re Olivetti
Underwood Corp., 246 A.2d 800 (Del. Ch. 1968).
98 158 A.2d 797 (Del. ch. 1960).
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court rejected, as too brief, an appraiser's use of a two year period as the
appropriate measure of earnings. The court pointed out that if average
net earnings were taken over the six years preceding the merger a net loss
was shown. The same result occurred when an eleven-year average was
used. The court refused to eliminate the loss on coffee futures on the
basis that the coffee market had and would remain stabilized. The judge
declared that there was no guarantee that the stability would continue.
He thus concluded that the use of a two year period which produced a
high earnings average was inappropriate.
Too long a time period also may distort the earnings average. Past
earnings may not reflect the current financial realities that a company
might face. In In re Olivetti Underwood99 a dissenting stockholder tried
to assert that the appraiser should have gone back thirteen years in deter-
mining the earnings average in order to take into account the early profit-
able years of operation. In rejecting the claim, the court noted that the
five years before the merger-years of increasing financial difficulty-
were more typical of the corporation's condition than the earlier years in
which money was made.
Sometimes a mechanical averaging of earnings realized during a spe-
cific time span is not appropriate. An attempt has to be made to identify
and eliminate any abnormalities in the earnings of a particular year. One
way of correcting for a windfall profit or extraordinary loss is to elimi-
nate the year in which it occurred from the calculations altogether. 100 A
more sophisticated alternative is to exclude the extraordinary item from
the earnings figure from that year altogether.101
External market factors also come into play in determining the earn-
ings average. InPerlman v. Feldmann ,102 the court had to determine the
value of the defendant's stock in a steel corporation for purposes of as-
sessing damages in a derivative action involving a sale of controlling
shares in a close corporation. Because of the advent of the Korean War,
the demand for steel had increased dramatically. The corporation, which
had expanded its facilities, experienced a big jump in earnings for two
months prior to the sale of the control block. For this reason, the earn-
99 246 A.2d 800 (Del. Ch. 1968).
100 In Application of Delaware Racing Association, supra note 94, the year prior to the com-
pany's assumption of long-term debt was eliminated from the five-year span because the earnings
were abnormally high.
101 For example, in Gibbons v. Schenley Industries, Inc., 339 A.2d 460 (Del. Ch. 1975), the gain
realized from the enforced sale of a subsidiary (pursuant to an anti-trust decree) was eliminated in
computing the five-year average; however, the appraiser included gains realized from the sale of
other assets (mainly real estate) because such sales occurred often.
102 154 F. Supp. 436 (D. Conn. 1957).
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ings record of the preceding years was essentially irrelevant. The court
was persuaded that the enterprise value would have to take into account
the probability that the high demand for steel would continue for at least
two years. Therefore, the court based its calculations on the two month
heightened earning period.
The court also noted tht the wartime conditions created a "reason-
able expectation" that an excess profits tax would be imposed (which
hindsight confirmed). "Any reasonably prudent investor considering the
advent of the Korean War and the accompanying boom would have fore-
seen the imposition of an excess profits tax with a consequential increase
in taxes to 65% of earnings or a percentage close to it."' ' 3 Therefore, the
earnings stream had to be discounted accordingly.
B. The Capitalization Rate or Multiplier
Once average annual earnings have been determined, a multiplier
must be chosen to capitalize the earnings into share value. The multi-
plier is the inverse of the capitalization rate. Choice of the multiplier is
probably the most conjectural of the valuation techniques.'04 The most
frequently cited authority in the area, Professor A.S. Dewing, has stated
that the determination of the capitalization rate is "perhaps the most
difficult and so far as the results are concerned the most important point
in any theory of value based on earnings power." 105
The choice of the multiplier theoretically encompasses the entire
range of factors considered in the valuation of a going concern. The mul-
tiplier will be low if the financial outlook is poor, or high if the prospects
are encouraging. 10 6 The relevant considerations include whether the
business is established, the prospects of an industry as a whole, and the
stability of income sources.107 As a practical matter, however, the multi-
plier is determined most often by reference to the average experience of
other companies in comparable businesses during times when interest
rates are relatively stable. A multiplier based on the price/earnings ratio
of a particular industry may be within the range of reason and has tended
not to be disturbed by the courts.108
103 Id. at 448. Compare this approach with that of the arbitrators in theAMINOIL Award where
reasonable expectations of both parties were made the centerpiece of the agreement.
104 BONBRIGHT,supra note 85, at 262; CARY & EISENBERG, SUpra note 96 at 133.
105 DEWING, 2 FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATION, 148 (1st ed. 1937) quoted in BONBRIGHT,
supra note 86 at 259.
106 Universal City Studios Inc. v. Francis I. DuPont, 334 A.2d 216 (Del. 1975), modifying 312
A.2d 344 (Del. Ch. 1973).
107 DEWING, supra note 105.
108 The multiplier or discount rate in times of wide swings in interest rates is harder to discern
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3. The Appraisal Index
In the past, courts in the United States traditionally have assigned a
percentage weight to each of the three values: net asset value, earnings
value and market value (if there is any). 109 The respective per share val-
because the present value of future income is affected by inflation and the return the cash in hand can
earn.
109 The following chart, CARY & EISENBERG, supra note 95 at 1456-60, indicates the weights
given in valuation proceedings by several leading cases.
PERCENTAGE WEIGHT (Dollar Values)
Asset Market Earnings Dividend (Result)
- 50 (S 129.00) 25 (S 90.00) 25 (S 83.00) - ($ 108.00)
-(a) 40 ( 139.60) 30 ( 113.00) 30 ( 149.00) - ( 131.74)
(b) 20 ( 32.54) 45 ( 12.13) 35 ( 16.90) - ( 17.88)
- 20 ( 46.57) 30 ( 14.00) 25 ( 11.97) 24 ($14.28) ( 20.08)
- 40 ( 42.35) - 60 ( 13.00) - ( 24.74)
- 20 ( 700.05) - 80 ( 365.23) - ( 432.09)
- 50 ( 35.67) 25 ( 18.69) 25 ( 8.82) - ( 24.71)
- 25 ( 5996.00) 40 (1305.00) 25 (1201.90) 10 (00.00) (2321.30)
- 60 ( 128.08) 10 ( 66.00) 30 ( 43.26) - ( 96.42)
- 50 ( 11.20) 25 ( 3.67) 25 ( 1.05) - ( 6.79)
- 25 ( 10.62) 50 ( 14.25) 25 ( 00.00) - ( 9.78)
- 50 (242.81) 25 ( 69.00) 25 ( 00.00) - (138.65)
- 12.5 ( 91.72) - 87.5 ( 92.89) - ( 92.75)
- - ( ) 55 ( 29.00) 45 ( 39.79) - ( 33.86)
Basis for Determination
I. In re General Realty & Utilities Corp., 29 Del. Ch. 480, 52 A.2d 6 (Ch. 1947). The assets, mostly
securities and real estate, were weighted more heavily because the corporation depended more upon the assets
than upon good management.
2. Jacques Coe & Co. v. Minneapolis-Moline Co., 31 Del. Ch. 368, 75 A.2d 244 (Ch. 1950).
(a) Preferred Stock: Asset value weighted more because it formed such a large part of the present
worth.
(b) Common Stock: Market value was more accurate because of active trading in the stock. Earnings
value was of less importance because no dividends had been recently paid.
3. Heller v. Munsingwear, Inc., 33 Del. Ch. 593, 98 A.2d 774 (Ch. 1953). Assets were downgraded
because they were so out of line with other values.
4. Sporborg v. City Specialty Stores, Inc., 35 Del. Ch. 560, 123 A.2d 121 (Ch. 1956). Market value
was disregarded because it was found to be artifically sustained. Asset value was weighted more than normal
because the corporation had recently expanded and improved assets, and such was not yet reflected in the
earnings value.
5. Felder v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 39 Del. Ch. 76, 159 A.2d 278 (Ch. 1960). There was no market
value for the stock in this case. The asset value was discounted because the court found that the method
utilized by the appraiser (depreciated replacement cost) was more than the actual asset value if not so
discounted.
6. Levin v. Midland-Ross Corp., 41 Del. Ch. 276, 194 A.2d 50 (Ch. 1963). Asset value was stressed
because approximately 50 per cent of corporate assets were liquid at the time of the appraisal, and the court
determined that these were the intrinsic value of the corporation.
7. Application of Delaware Racing Ass'n, 42 Del. Ch. 406, 213 A.2d 203 (Sup. Ct.),affirming 42 Del.
Ch. 175, 206 A.2d 664 (Ch. 1965). Assets were discounted and market value stressed because the court
determined that the market was the only place where the value of the corporation, a raceway with obsolete
facilities and depressed earnings, could be adequately measured. Lack of dividends considered to balance the
weighting of market value.
8. Swanton v. State Guaranty Corp., 42 Del. Ch. 477, 215 A.2d 242 (Ch. 1965). Assets stressed to
reflect the fact that the corporation had engaged in a policy of investment in capital appreciation. Such a
weighting would allow consideration of future prospects of such a policy.
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ues are then multiplied by the percentage weight and added together to
compute (obtain) the fair value per share. Selection of the percentage
gives the appraiser an opportunity to discriminate among types of firms
and adjust for the special circumstances of a company. For example, in
Tome Land & Improvement v. Silva ,, o the corporation's principal asset
was land. It had no earnings to speak of. Therefore, the trial court as-
signed sixty percent weight to asset value and no weight at all to earnings
value in appraising the value of the shares. This approach was echoed in
Bell v. Kirby Lumber,' where the court held that assignment of a forty
percent weight to the net asset value was not erroneous because the asset
base of a natural resource company is a major component of its worth.
The appraisal index is a tool for minimizing the imperfections of any one
valuation method.
X. CONCLUSION
As the foregoing analysis illustrates, a pragmatic approach to valua-
tion problems influences both United States courts and international ar-
bitrators. One should not infer from such flexibility that the "prompt,
adequate and effective" standard is invalid any more than one would ar-
gue that, because United States courts approach valuation contextually,
there is no legal standard supporting their decision.
One overriding concern emerges from the comparison of the valua-
tion techniques: a concern for fairness. The decision makers in both
cases start from the assumption that fairness dictates that one who has
risked his capital, induced by promises of a host country, has the right to
receive a fair value for that investment should it be confiscated. When
viewed in this light, "prompt, adequate and effective" is no more than a
standard of fairness.
9. Poole v. N.V. Deli Maatschappij, 243 A.2d 67 (Del. Ch. 1968). Assets stressed because of nature of
corporation as a holder of tobacco-producing lands.
10. In re Olivetti Underwood Corp., 246 A.2d 800 (Del. Ch. 1968). Earnings are considered such an
important factor in the value of a corporation that they are weighted even though nonexistent. Market value
stressed because the market for such stocks had been in existence for some time and was a strong indicator of
value.
11. Brown v. Hedahl's-Q B & R, Inc., 185 N.W.2d 249 (N.D. 1971). Asset value stressed because of the
nature of the corporation as an auto parts retailer.
12. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Francis I. duPont & Co., 334 A.2d 216 (Del. 1975), modifying 312
A.2d 344 (Del. Ch. 1973). Earnings value stressed because at the time of merger corporation had a better than
average earnings picture. There was no market for the stock.
13. Gibbons v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 339 A.2d 460 (Del. Ch. 1975). Assets ignored because majority
were in idle and obsolete manufacturing plants. Court determined that assets are to be valued as to ability to
generate earnings. Here the vast amount of corporate earnings came from distribution agreements for im-
ported whisky. Market value was determined to be reliable, and court found a growing trend to favor market
value when possible.
110 83 N.M. 549, 494 P.2d 962, 967 (1972).
111 413 A.2d 137 (Del. 1980).
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Those who object to this standard, to be sure, also may be motivated
by what they view as a sense of fairness. Professor Baxter is correct in
his assertion that "newly independent states . . . can influence the pro-
gressive development of the law or help to "codify" it in such a way as to
make it more responsive to their needs and ideals." 1 2
There are serious policy reasons for maintaining such a standard of
fundamental fairness whether they are described as "prompt, adequate
and effective" or otherwise. Any serious dilution of this standard could
cause international development capital to disappear. The victims of
such a state of affairs would be the very developing countries that a new
rule formulation was supposed to help. For in the final analysis, stability
does not benefit the western industrialized nations alone; it is the only
climate in which development capital can be made available. If the re-
cent international financial crisis is any indication, the developed coun-
tries are much better equipped to adjust to an unstable economic
environment than the less developed ones. It is therefore neither patron-
izing nor insensitive to suggest that developing countries have far more
to gain in a world where the rule of law changes by the slow process of
gathering a consensus among the states, than in one where law means
whatever any particular state wants it to mean. Freedom of the individ-
ual to do what he pleases is circumscribed in municipal law by the obliga-
tion not to injure others. Under international law "sovereignty" carries
similar obligations. One of the important aspects of sovereignty is the
ability to make binding commitments and to make and respond to just
claims pursuant to international norms.
The principal conclusion that can be drawn from a study of the law
in different systems is that, odd as it may seem, the sense of justice which
pervades all legal systems tends to lead to very similar results by some-
times quite different paths. It is the intention of this article to indicate
that this is true as well in the law of compensation, including the method
of valuation, both for the nationalization of alien property under interna-
tional standards and for the law of compensation applied in the United
States under analogous conditions.
112 HENKIN, supra note 10, at 73.
